On Worst-Case to Average-Case Reductions for NP Problems

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Abstract

We show that if an NP-complete problem has a non-adaptive self-corrector with respect to a samplable distribution then coNP is contained in AM/poly and the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level. Feigenbaum and Fortnow show the same conclusion under the stronger assumption that an NP-complete problem has a non-adaptive random self-reduction.

Our result shows it is impossible (using non-adaptive reductions) to base the average-case hardness of a problem in NP or the security of a one-way function on the worst-case complexity of an NP-complete problem (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).

1. Introduction

Worst-Case versus Average-Case Complexity

A problem in distributional NP [18] is a pair $(L, D)$ where $L$ is an NP decision problem and $D$ is a samplable distribution of instances.\(^1\)

The fundamental question in the study of average-case complexity is whether there are intractable problems in distributional NP. Of course the question can be formalized in different ways depending on how we define intractability (and tractability). For the sake of this paper we will consider a problem $(L, D)$ tractable if for every polynomial $p()$ there is a polynomial time algorithm $A$ such that, for any $n$, there is a probability at most $1/p(n)$, according to $D$, to generate an instance of length $n$ on which $A$ makes a mistake,\(^2\) and we say that $(L, D)$ is intractable otherwise.

Results by Ajtai [2] suggest that the question of whether every distributional NP problem is tractable may be reduced to the standard question of whether NP \(\subseteq\) BPP.

Ajtai shows that an algorithm that solves well on average the shortest vector problem (an NP problem) under a certain samplable distribution of instances implies an algorithm that solves, in the worst case, an approximate version of the shortest vector problem, which can be seen as an NP promise problem. If the latter problem were NP-complete, then we would have a reduction relating the average-case hardness of an NP distributional problem to the worst-case hardness of an NP-complete problem. Unfortunately, the latter problem is known to be in NP \(\cap\) coNP, and therefore it is unlikely to be NP-hard. However, it is conceivable that improved versions of Ajtai’s argument could show the equivalence between the average-case complexity of a distributional NP problem and the worst-case complexity of an NP problem.

Ajtai’s approach has been extended by Ajtai and Dwork [3] and Regev [21], who present public-key cryptosystems whose security (which is a stronger condition than the existence of hard-on-average problems in NP) is equivalent to the worst-case complexity of certain NP promise problems.

Such results re-opened the old question (appearing already in [10, Section 6]) of whether there are cryptosystems that are NP-hard to break, that is, whose security can be based on the assumption that NP \(\not\subseteq\) BPP.

\(^1\) Actually, we think of $D$ as being a samplable ensemble of distributions, that is, for every $n$ there is a distribution $D_n$ on instances of length $n$, and there is a polynomial time sampler that on input $1^n$ samples from $D_n$. This is the standard convention in cryptography and in the study of “amplification of hardness” and worst-case to average-case reductions for various problems, including problems in NP [20]. It is, however, different from the convention used by Levin [18], which refers to a single distribution over all possible inputs. Impagliazzo [15] shows that the two conventions are, essentially, interchangeable.

\(^2\) This is essentially the definition of Heuristic Polynomial Time given by Impagliazzo [15]. One gets, essentially, Levin’s definition of Average Polynomial Time [18] by requiring $A$ to output either the right answer or FAIL on every input, and that the probability of answering FAIL when given an instance sampled from $D$ is at most $1/p(n)$. Our proof could be modified so that our result would hold also with respect to Levin’s definition of tractability and intractability.
Previous Work on Worst-case versus Average-case Complexity in NP

As discussed in [15], we know oracles relative to which NP $\not\subseteq P/poly$ but every distributional NP problem is tractable. Therefore, any proof that, say, “NP $\not\subseteq BPP$ implies the existence of hard-on-average problems in NP” must use a non-relativizing argument.

Since Ajtai’s arguments exploit properties of specific problems, it does not seem that relativization results apply to them.

Feigenbaum and Fortnow [11] consider the notion of locally random reduction, which is a natural way to prove that the average-case complexity of a given problem relates to the worst-case complexity of another one. A locally random reduction from a language $L$ to a distributional problem $(L', D)$ is a polynomial-time oracle procedure $R$ such that $R^L$ solves $R$ and, furthermore, each oracle query of $R^L(x)$ is distributed according to $D$. Clearly, such a reduction converts a heuristic polynomial time algorithm for $(L', D)$ (with sufficiently small error probability) into a BPP algorithm for $L$. If we could have a locally random reduction from, say, 3SAT to some problem $(L', D)$ in distributional NP, then we would have proved that if NP $\not\subseteq BPP$ then distributional NP contains intractable problems.

Feigenbaum and Fortnow show that if there is a non-adaptive locally random reduction from a problem $L$ to a problem $(L', D)$ in distributional NP, then $L$ is in coAM/poly = coNP/poly. In particular, if $L$ is NP-complete, then NP $\subseteq$ coNP/poly and the polynomial hierarchy collapses.

Locally random reductions are a natural notion, and they have been used to establish the worst-case to average-case equivalence of certain PSPACE-complete and EXP-complete problems.

Previous Results on Cryptography versus NP-hardness

Brassard [9] considers the question of whether there can be a public key cryptosystem whose security can be reduced to solving an NP-complete problem. Brassard argues that, under some assumptions on the key-generation algorithm and the encryption procedure, the problem of inverting the encryption is in NP $\cap$ coNP, and therefore unlikely to be equivalent to an NP-complete problem. Goldreich and Goldwasser [12] revisited the issue more recently, and tried to remove some of the assumptions in Brassard’s result. They showed that the existence of a reduction from an NP-complete problem to the problem of breaking a public-key cryptosystem would imply the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy (under some assumptions on the way the reduction works and/or on the key generation algorithm).

The results of Brassard [9] and of Goldreich and Goldwasser [12] refer to the complexity of breaking a cryptosystem for every message and for every key. Clearly, if even such a strong form of attack cannot be NP-hard (under certain assumptions) then neither can the weaker form of attack considered in standard definitions of security (in which the attacker only needs to distinguish the encryptions of two possible messages with noticeable probability). In the setting of private key encryption, however, this approach does not seem to work, and it seems necessary to specifically address the issue of the average-case complexity of attacking a construction. In particular, the possibility of private-key encryption is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions, and it is well known that there are “one-way functions” that are NP-hard to invert on all inputs.4

A generic reduction from an NP-complete problem to the problem of inverting a one-way function $f$ would be an oracle procedure $R$ such that for some polynomial $p$ and every oracle $A$ that inverts $f$ on a $1 - 1/p(n)$ inputs of length $n$, we have that $R^A$ is a BPP algorithm for 3SAT. The techniques of Feigenbaum and Fortnow imply that if $R$ is non-adaptive, and if all of its oracle queries are done according to the same distribution (that depends only on the length of the input), then the existence of such a reduction implies that the polynomial hierarchy collapses.

As we explain below, our results show the same conclusion without the assumption on the distribution of the queries made by $R^A$. (But we still need the assumption that the queries are non-adaptive.)

Our Result

We say that a language $L$ has a worst-case to average-case reduction with parameter $\delta$ to a distributional problem $(L', D)$ if there is a reduction $R$ (say, realized by a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm) such that, for every oracle $A$ that agrees with $L'$ on inputs of probability mass $1 - \delta$ according to $D$ on each input length, $R^A$ solves $L$ on every input.

If $L$ and $L'$ are the same language, then the reduction is called a self-corrector, a notion independently introduced by Blum and others [7] and by Lipton [19] in the context of program checking [5, 6].

As argued below, a locally random reduction is also a worst-case to average-case reduction and a random self-reduction is also a self-corrector, but the reverse need not be true.

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3 Or, rather, according to $D_m$ where $m$ depends only on the input length of $x$.

4 For example, take the function that on input a 3SAT formula $\phi$ and an assignment $a$, outputs 0 if the formula is not satisfied by $a$, and outputs 1 otherwise.
In this paper we show that if there is a worst-case to average-case reduction with parameter \(1/\text{poly}(n)\) from an \(\text{NP}\)-complete problem \(L\) to a distributional \(\text{NP}\) problem \((L, D)\), then \(\text{NP} \subseteq \text{coNP/poly}\) and the polynomial hierarchy collapses.

In particular, if an \(\text{NP}\)-complete problem has a self-corrector with respect to a samplable distribution, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses.

We first prove the result for the special case in which the distribution \(D\) is uniform.

Using a reductions by Impagliazzo and Levin [16] and by Ben-David and others [4], we show that the same is true even the reduction assumes a good-on-average algorithm for the search version of \(L\)', and even if we measure average-case complexity for \(L\)' with respect to an arbitrary samplable distribution \(D\).

The generalization to arbitrary samplable distributions and to search problems also implies that there cannot be any non-adaptive reduction from an \(\text{NP}\)-complete problem to the problem of inverting a one way function.

Our result also rules out non-adaptive reductions from an \(\text{NP}\)-complete problem to the problem of breaking a public-key cryptosystem. The constraint of non-adaptivity of the reduction is incomparable to the constraints in the results of Goldreich and Goldwasser [12].

It should be noted that the reductions of Ajtai, Dwork and Regev [2, 3, 21] are adaptive.

**Comparison with Feigenbaum-Fortnow [11]**

A locally random reduction \(R\) that makes \(q\) queries is also a worst-case to average-case reduction with parameter \(1/O(q)\). Indeed, if \(A\) is an oracle that has agreement, say, \(1 - 1/4q\) with \(L\)', and we access the oracle via \(q\) queries, each uniformly distributed, there is a probability at least \(3/4\) that queries made to \(A\) are answered in the same way as queries made to \(L\)'.

On the other hand, the restriction that all queries must have the same distribution is quite strong, and one could imagine reductions where the distribution of the queries is somewhat dependent on the input, as long as, for every small subset of possible queries, a majority of the queries land outside of the subset with high probability. Furthermore, locally random reductions lack nice closure properties. We would like to say that if solving \(L\) in the worst case is reducible to solving \(L'\) on a \(1 - \delta\) fraction of inputs, and if solving \(L'\) on a \(1 - \delta\) fraction of inputs is reducible to solving \(L''\) on a \(1 - \delta'\) fraction of inputs, then solving \(L\) in the worst case is reducible to solving \(L''\) on a \(1 - \delta''\) fraction of inputs. Reductions among distributional problems [18] typically produce instances for the target problem that are not necessarily uniformly distributed, but just have a distribution that is *dominated* by the uniform distribution (that is, no instance is produced with a probability more than polynomially larger than in the uniform distribution.)

For this reason, it is interesting, for starters, to have a generalization of the result of Feigenbaum and Fortnow to the case of a reduction \(R\) such that \(R^{L'}\) computes \(L\), and each oracle query is made with a probability at most polynomially larger than in the uniform distribution. We could call such reductions *smooth random reductions*. However it seems more interesting to just drop all restrictions on the distribution of the queries of \(R\), and just impose the condition that we are interested in: that \(R\) works when given any oracle that solves \(L\)' well on average.

Readers who are familiar with the following notions may have noted that the relation between locally random reductions and our notion of worst-case to average-case reduction is similar to the relation between one-round private information retrieval and locally checkable codes. In one-round private information retrieval, a user is given oracle access to the encoding of a certain string, and wants to retrieve one bit of the string by making a bounded number of queries; the restriction is that the \(i\)-th query must have a distribution independent of the bit that one is interested in. In a locally checkable code, a decoder is given oracle access to the encoding of a certain string, and the encoding has been corrupted in a \(\delta\) fraction of places; the decoder wants to retrieve a bit of the original string by making a bounded number of queries. The notion of a smooth code, which is the analogue of a smooth random reduction, has also been studied. In a smooth code, a decoder is given oracle access to the encoding of a certain string, and wants to retrieve one bit of the string by making a bounded number of queries; the restriction is that the distribution of each query should be dominated by the uniform distribution.

For unbounded users/decoder the three notions have been shown equivalent [17, 13], but the same methods do not work in the computationally bounded setting studied in this paper. One step in our proof is, however, inspired by the techniques used to show this equivalence.

**Our Proof**

As in the work of Feigenbaum and Fortnow, we use the fact that problems in \(\text{coAM/poly}\) cannot be \(\text{NP}\)-complete unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. So our goal is to show that if \(L\) is in \(\text{NP}\) and it has a \(1/\text{poly}(n)\) worst-case to average-case reduction to a language \(L'\) in \(\text{NP}\), then \(L\) is also in \(\text{coAM/poly}\).

We start by discussing the case in which \(D\) is the uniform distribution.

*The Feigenbaum-Fortnow protocol.* Let us first briefly review the proof of Feigenbaum and Fortnow. Given \(x\), a prover wants to prove that \(R^{L'}(x)\) rejects, where \(R\) makes \(q\) non-adaptive queries, each uniformly distributed. The (non-
uniform) verifier generates \( k \) independent computations of \( R^L(x) \) and sends to the prover all the \( kq \) queries generated in all the \( k \) runs. The prover has to provide all the answers, and certificates for all the YES answers. The verifier, non-uniformly, knows the overall fraction \( p \) of queries of \( R^L(x) \) whose answer is YES and, if \( k \) is large enough, the verifier expects the number of YES answers from the prover to be concentrated around \( kqp \), and it rejects if the prover gives fewer than \( kqp - O(q\sqrt{k}) \) YES answers. A cheating prover can only cheat by saying NO on a YES instance, and cannot do so on more than \( O(q\sqrt{k}) \). If \( k \) is sufficiently larger than \( q \), then with high probability either the verifier rejects or at least one of the \( k \) computations of \( R^L(x) \) yields correct answers.

Handling Smooth Reductions. Notice that the Feigenbaum-Fortnow protocol can be used with every oracle procedure \( R^L(x) \), provided that given \( x \) we can get a good estimate of the average number of oracle queries of \( R^L(x) \) that are answered YES. Suppose that \( R \) is a smooth random reduction, that is, each possible query is generated with probability at most polynomially larger than in the uniform distribution. We devise a hiding protocol in which the verifier either rejects or gets a good estimate of the fraction of queries of \( R^L(x) \) that are answered YES. We pick at random a query \( y \) of \( R^L(x) \), that is, we select randomness for \( R^l(x) \), we get \( q \) queries, and pick at random one of them. Then we “immerse” \( y \) in a random position in a sequence of \( k \) random elements of \( L \) of the same length, and we give the sequence to the prover. The prover has to say which of the elements in the sequence is a YES instance, and give a certificate for each of them; it is also required to give at least \( pk - O(\sqrt{k}) \) certificates, where \( p \) is the fraction of elements of \( L \) of that length that are YES instances (the verifier is given \( p \) non-uniformly). A cheating prover can give at most \( O(\sqrt{k}) \) wrong answers and, roughly speaking, if \( k \) is large enough, more than \( \sqrt{k} \) elements of the sequence look like queries of \( R^l(x) \). With high probability, either the verifier rejects or it gets the right answer for \( y \). Repeating the process in parallel many times gives a good estimate of the fraction of queries that are answered YES. This argument is already powerful enough to generalize the result of Feigenbaum and Fortnow to smooth reductions.

Handling General Reductions. Let \( R \) be an arbitrary \( \delta \) worst-case to average-case reduction from \( L \) to \( L' \) such that \( R^l(x) \) makes \( q \) queries of length \( m \). Intuitively, we would like to convert \( R \) to a smooth reduction as follows: fix a threshold \( t = q/\delta \), then for every query made by \( R^l(x) \) compute the probability that that query be generated by \( R^l(x) \). Call a possible query “heavy” if it is generated with probability more than \( t/2^m \) be the reduction, and “light” otherwise. Ask light queries to the oracle, and do not ask the heavy ones, but proceed as if the heavy ones had been answered NO. Let \( R' \) be this modified procedure. Then \( R^l(x) \) behaves like \( R^l(x) \) where \( A \) differs from \( L' \) only on the queries that have a probability more than \( t/2^m \) of being generated, so that \( A \) agrees with \( L' \) on at least a \( 1 - \delta \) fraction of inputs, and \( R^{L'}(x) \) works with high probability. Furthermore, \( R' \) is smooth by construction.\(^5\) The problem is that it is hard to compute, or even to prove in an AM protocol, the exact value of the probability that a given query be asked by \( R \). We will settle for approximations, and, roughly speaking, \( R' \) will ask a query \( y \) to the oracle if the probability of \( y \) is less than \( t(1-\epsilon)/2^m \) and will simulate a NO answer to \( y \) if the probability of \( y \) is more than \( t(1+\epsilon)/2^m \), and we get in trouble when the probability is in the middle. By picking \( t \) at random in a certain range, instead of fixing it to \( \delta/q \), we can make sure that with high probability there are few queries for which we get in trouble. Given a query \( y \) and a threshold \( t \), the Goldwasser-Sipser [14] protocol can be used to prove that the \( y \) is “approximately heavy.”\(^6\) Unfortunately there is no good protocol to prove that \( y \) is an approximately light query. Instead, we show how to use the Aiello-H˚astad [1] protocol to convince the verifier that the fraction of light queries is approximately some value \( \ell \). Then the verifier runs a modified immersion protocol to estimate the fraction of heavy queries that are answered YES. In the modified immersion protocol, the prover receives a random query of \( R^l(x) \) immersed in a sequence or uniformly random strings. The prover has to provide a certificate for each YES instance, and also, for each string that is a heavy query of the protocol, a proof that it is a heavy query. Then the verifier can check that the fraction of queries identified as heavy is about \( 1-\ell \), and get a good estimate \( r \) of the fraction of heavy queries whose answer is YES. Finally, we run a modified Feigenbaum-Fortnow protocol in which we give to the prover the queries of \( k \) instantiations of \( R^l(x) \). The prover has to provide certificates for all the YES instances, and proofs of heaviness for all the heavy queries. The verifier checks that about \( (1-\ell)kq \) queries are claimed to be heavy, a fraction \( r \) of them has certificates, and proceed as if the non-heavy queries had been answered NO.

General Distributions \( D \), Search Problems, One-Way Functions. So far we have described our results for the case in which \( D \) is a samplable distribution. We show that a reduction of Impagliazzo and Levin [16] implies that for every distributional NP problem \((L, D)\) and bound \( \delta = 1/nO(1) \) there is a non-adaptive probabilistic polynomial time oracle algorithm \( R \), an NP language \( L' \), and a bound \( \delta' = 1/nO(1) \) such that for every oracle \( A \) that has agrees with \( L' \) on a \( 1 - \delta' \) fraction of inputs, \( R^{L'} \) solves \( L \) on a subset of inputs of density \( 1 - \delta \) under the distribution \( D \).

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5 This is the way locally decodable codes are shown equivalent to smooth codes in [17].

6 Formally, an honest prover succeeds with high probability if the probability of \( y \) is less than \( t(1-\epsilon)/2^m \), and a cheating prover fails with high probability if the probability of \( y \) is more than \( t/2^m \).
This means that if there were a non-adaptive worst-case to average-case reduction with parameter $1/poly(n)$ from a problem $L$ to a distributional problem $(L', D)$, there would also be such a reduction from $L$ to $(L'', U)$, where $U$ is the uniform distribution and $L''$ is in NP. By the previously described results, this would imply the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy.

A reduction by Ben-David and others [4] implies that for every distributional NP problem $(L, U)$ there is a problem $L'$ in NP such that an algorithm that solves the decision version of $(L', U)$ on a $1 - \delta$ fraction of inputs can be modified (via a non-adaptive reduction) into an algorithm that solves the search version of $(L, U)$ on a $1 - \delta \cdot poly(n)$ fraction of input. This implies that even if modify the definition of worst-case to average-case reduction so that the oracle $A$ is supposed to solve the search version of the problem, our results still apply. In particular, for every polynomial time computable function $f$, the problem of inverting $f$ well on average is precisely the problem of solving well on average a distributional NP search problem. Therefore our results also rule out the possibility of basing one-way functions on NP-hardness using non-adaptive reductions.

2. Definitions and notation

We use functional and set notation for boolean functions interchangeably; say if $L : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, then “$x \in L$” is the same as “$L(x) = 1$”.

By “$k$ parallel instantiations” of an $r$ round protocol $P$, we mean a protocol $P'$ which creates $k$ statistically independent instantiations $P_1, \ldots, P_k$ of $P$, and in its $i$th round runs the $i$th round of each $P_j$. At the end, $P$ combines the outputs of the $P_j$ according to a specified rule.

A nonadaptive worst-case to average-case randomized reduction from $L$ to $(L', D)$ with average hardness $\delta$ (in short, a $\delta$ worst-to-average reduction) is a family of polynomial size circuits $R = \{R_n\}$ such that: (1) On input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, randomness $r$, $R_n(x; r)$ outputs strings $y_1, \ldots, y_k$ and a circuit $A$, called the decoder. (2) For any $L^*$ that is $\delta$-close to $L'$ with respect to $D$,

$$\Pr_r[A(y_1, \ldots, y_k; L^*(y_1), \ldots, L^*(y_k)) = L(x)] > 2/3.$$

Sometimes we denote the distributional problem $(L', U)$, where $U$ is the uniform distribution, just by $L'$.

**Remarks.** The constant $2/3$ can be made $1 - 2^{-\Omega(k)}$ by parallel instantiation and taking majority at the end. We will assume this better bound from here on.

Without loss of generality, we may assume the number of strings $k = poly(n)$ depends only on $n = |x|$, but not on the specific input $x$.

For notational convenience, we assume that all queries $y_1, \ldots, y_k \in \{0, 1\}^m$ have the same length $m = poly(n)$ that depends only on $n$ but not on $x$. This assumption cannot be made without loss of generality, however all the proofs that we give can be generalized to the case of queries with different length, mostly by just replacing every mention of $\{0, 1\}^m$ with the set of strings of length at most $m$, and every use of $2^{-m}$ with $2^{-m-1} + 1$.

One may also ask what happens to “Las Vegas” reductions that are only required to run in expected polynomial time. By standard tricks, it is not difficult to see that the existence of $\delta$ worst-to-average Las Vegas reductions implies the existence of $\delta$ worst-to-average ordinary reductions.

We use $\omega$ to denote a function that grows faster than any constant, and we will abuse notation by writing expressions like $\omega + \omega = \omega$, $\omega^2 = \omega$, etc. “With high probability,” or whp, means with probability $1 - o(1)$.

3. Preliminaries

Here we outline two protocols and a sampling bound that will be used in the analysis.

The Lower Bound Protocol

Given an NP set $S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ a bound $s$, we are interested in an AM protocol for the statement $|S| \geq s$. Consider the following protocol, due to Goldwasser and Sipser [14]:

1. Verifier: Choose a pairwise independent hash function $h : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \Gamma$, where $|\Gamma| = s/k$, and send $h$ to the prover.
2. Prover: Send a list $r_1, \ldots, r_l \in \{0, 1\}^m$.
3. Verifier: If $r_i \not\in S$ for any $i$, reject. If $l < (1 - \epsilon/3)k$, reject. If $h(r_i) \neq 0$ for any $i$, reject. Otherwise, accept.

**Lemma 1.** If $|S| \geq s$, there exists a prover that makes the verifier accept with probability $1 - 9/\epsilon^2k$. If $|S| \leq (1 - \epsilon)s$, no prover makes the verifier accept with probability more than $9/\epsilon^2k$.

The Upper Bound Protocol

Suppose that the verifier of an AM protocol has access to a “secret” $r$, chosen uniformly at random from an NP set $S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$. Can the verifier take advantage of her secret to verify a statement of the form $|S| \leq s$? Consider the following protocol, due to Aiello and Håstad [1]:

1. Verifier: Choose a 3-wise independent hash function $h : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \Gamma$, where $|\Gamma| = (s - 1)/k$ and send the pair $(h, h(r))$ to the prover.
2. Prover: Send a list $r_1, \ldots, r_l \in \{0, 1\}^m$.
3. Verifier: If $r_i \not\in S$ for any $i$, reject. If $l > (1 + \epsilon/3)k$ or $r \not\in \{r_1, \ldots, r_l\}$, reject. Otherwise, accept.
**Lemma 2.** If $|S| \leq s$, there exists a prover that makes the verifier accept with probability $1 - 9/e^2k$. If $|S| \geq (1 + \epsilon)s$, no prover makes the verifier accept with probability $1 + 9/e^2k - \epsilon/6$.

At a first glance, this protocol may not seem very useful, as the completeness-soundness gap is very narrow. However, suppose we fix $\epsilon$ and want to apply $t$ iterations of the protocol. Then choosing $k = \omega(t/e^2)$ will ensure that, with high probability, a good prover will never make the verifier reject. On the other hand, a crooked prover may cheat by more than an $\epsilon$ fraction only on about $O(1/\epsilon)$ of the $t$ iterations. For $t$ large enough, this becomes a negligible fraction of the total number of iterations. In our application of the protocol, we will be able to tolerate such a small fraction of errors.

**Additive bounds for random sampling**

The following lemma is an easy consequence of the Chernoff bound:

**Lemma 3.** Let $\epsilon < 1$, $T \subseteq \Omega$, $\mathcal{R}$ a distribution on $\Omega$, $\mathcal{R}(T) = p$ and $S$ an $N > 3\log(n/2)/\epsilon^3$ element random sample from $\Omega$, drawn from $\mathcal{R}$. With probability $1 - \eta$, $|S \cap T|/N \in [p \pm \epsilon]$.

In most applications here we set $\eta = o(1)$, so that the estimate holds with high probability.

**4. Proof Outline**

By a theorem of Boppana et al. [8], if $\text{coNP} \subseteq \text{AM/poly}$, then $\Sigma_3 \neq \Pi_3$. Therefore, assuming $\Sigma_3 \neq \Pi_3$, the lack of a $\delta$ worst-to-average reductions from NP-hard $L$ to some $L' \in \text{NP}$ will follow from the existence of an AM protocol for $L$.

**Theorem 1.** Let $L$ be an NP-complete language under polynomial-time reductions, $L' \in \text{NP}$, $\delta = n^{-O(1)}$. If there is a $\delta$ worst-to-average reduction from $L$ to $L'$, then there is an AM/poly protocol for $L$.

Let $R$ denote the reduction from the Theorem. Fix the input $x$, and let $\mathcal{R}_i : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow [0, 1]$ denote the distribution on the $i$th query produced by $R$ on input $x$. We will use $|r|$ to denote the number of random bits used by the reduction. We use $R(x; \cdot)$ to denote the randomized computation which, on input $x$, outputs $y_1, \ldots, y_k$ and $A$. We call $R(x; \cdot)$ the instantiation of $R$ on $x$.

Without loss of generality, we may assume that the distributions $\mathcal{R}_i$ are all equal. This is because the reduction $R$ can apply a uniform random permutation to the queries $y_1, \ldots, y_k$, and have the decoder “disentangle” the permutation before it runs. Then the marginal distribution of every query becomes $(\mathcal{R}_1 + \ldots + \mathcal{R}_k)/k \approx \mathcal{R}$.

The $\text{coAM}$ protocol for $L$ will consist of three phases. In the first phase, we will look for a “threshold” $t^* = O(\delta^{-1})$ such that $\Pr_{y \sim \mathcal{R}}[\mathcal{R}(y) < t^*2^{-m}]$ can be estimated within an inverse polynomial additive factor. In the second phase, we will use a “hiding protocol” to figure out a good estimate for the fraction of the queries $y$ in $L$ such that $\mathcal{R}(y) < t^*2^{-m}$. In the last phase, we will apply a variant of the Feigenbaum-Fortnow protocol for these queries.

Let $G : \{0, 1\}^{|r|} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ denote the circuit that, on input $r$, computes $R(x; r)$ and outputs the query $y_i$. When $r$ is chosen uniformly at random, this circuit generates a query $y$ sampled from $\mathcal{R}$.

**5. The First Phase**

Let $\Lambda(t) = \{ y : \mathcal{R}(y) < t^*2^{-m} \}$ and $p(t) = \mathcal{R}(\Lambda(t))$.

We think of $\Lambda(t)$ as a “ball of radius $t$.” In this phase of the protocol, we look for a value of $t$ such that a good lower bound on $p(t)$ can be obtained. We will estimate $p(t)$ by random sampling: Generate a sample $y \sim \mathcal{R}$ and test if $y \in \Lambda(t)$. Since there is no easy way to establish if $y \in \Lambda(t)$, we will take advantage of the prover for this purpose. The upper and lower bound protocols will ensure that the prover cannot cheat by much without getting caught.

First an easy technical lemma. Let $\epsilon = 1/\omega k$.

**Lemma 4.** Fix an arbitrary sequence $0 < t_0 < t_1 < \ldots < t_l = 2^m$, where $l = \omega/\epsilon$. For $i^*$ chosen uniformly at random from $\{1, \ldots, l\}$, with high probability, $p(t_{i^*}) \leq p(t_{i^* - 1}) + \epsilon$.

We will apply the lemma to the sequence $t_i \triangleq \delta^{-1}(1 + \epsilon/\omega)^i$, so that $t_i = O(\delta^{-1})$ for $1 \leq i \leq \omega/\epsilon$.

We now present the first phase protocol:

1. **Verifier:** Let $l = \omega/\epsilon^3$. Choose $r_1, \ldots, r_l$ uniformly and independently from $\{0, 1\}^{|r|}$. Send $y_{j^*} \triangleq G(r_{j^*})$ for $1 \leq j \leq l$ to the prover.

2. **Prover:** For each $1 \leq j \leq s$, send a claim $\rho_j$ for the value $2^{\epsilon l} \mathcal{R}(y_{j^*})$.

3. **Verifier:** For each $1 \leq j \leq s$, initiate (in parallel) the upper bound protocol for the claim $|G^{-1}(y_{j^*})| \leq \rho_j$, with $k = \omega^2/\epsilon^5$. If any of the instances rejects, reject.

4. **Verifier:** For each $1 \leq j \leq s$, initiate (in parallel) the lower bound protocol for the claim $|G^{-1}(y_{j^*})| \geq \rho_j$. If any of the instances rejects, reject. Otherwise, choose $i^*$ uniformly at random from $\{1, \ldots, \omega/\epsilon\}$, let $t^* = t_{i^*} = \delta^{-1}(1 + \epsilon/\omega)^i$, and set $p^* = \left[\frac{\{j : \rho_j2^{-|r|} < t^*2^{-m}\}}{l}\right]$.

**Lemma 5.** For every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ there exists a “good” prover for which, with high probability, at the end of the Step 4, the verifier has not rejected.
Proof. This prover sends claims $\rho_j = 2^{\lceil r \rceil} R(y_j) = |G^{-1}(y_j)|$. By Lemma 2, each upper bound protocol instantiation succeeds (does not reject) with probability $1 - 9\omega/\epsilon^2 k = 1 - 1/\omega l$. There are $l$ such instantiations, so with high probability all of them pass without causing a rejection. Similarly by Lemma 1, all of the lower bound protocol instantiations pass without causing a rejection.

Lemma 6. For every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and for any prover, with high probability, at the end of Step 3 either the verifier rejects or $p^* > p(t^*) - \epsilon$.

Proof. Suppose that the verifier does not reject. Intuitively, there are two ways the prover can cheat on any given query. It can either cheat “a little” by reporting some value $\rho_j$ such that $\rho_j > 2^{\lceil r \rceil} R(y_j)$, but $\rho_j < (1 + \epsilon) 2^{\lceil r \rceil} R(y_j)$, or it can cheat by “a lot” by reporting a $\rho_j$ which is “way off”, i.e., $\rho_j \geq (1 + \epsilon) 2^{\lceil r \rceil} R(y_j)$. In the end, the samples $y_j$ are used to obtain an estimate of $p(t^*)$. Our goal will be to show that, with high probability, neither way of cheating has a significant effect on our estimate for $p(t^*)$. In addition to the errors caused by the cheating behavior of the prover, we will also have to account for errors “coming from nature”, namely those caused by deviations in random sampling.

Let $C = \{ j : \rho_j \geq (1 + \epsilon) 2^{\lceil r \rceil} R(y_j) \}$. The set $C$ represents the queries on which the prover “cheats a lot.” We show that this set is rather small: By Lemma 2, if $j \in C$, then the $j$th protocol instantiation causes a rejection with probability $> \epsilon/6\omega - 9\omega/\epsilon^2 k = \epsilon/\omega$. By Markov’s inequality, with high probability $|C| < 1/\epsilon < \epsilon l$ provided the verifier doesn’t reject.

We now consider the queries on which the prover can “cheat a little”. These are the queries that fall into the set $\Lambda(t_*) - \Lambda(t_{* - 1})$. Let $J_* = \{ j : y_j \in \Lambda(t_*) \}$ and $B = J_* - J_{* - 1}$. We show that, with high probability, the number of queries in $B$ is a negligible fraction of $l$:

$$|B| = |J_*| - |J_{* - 1}|$$

$$< (p(t_*) + \epsilon)l - (p(t_{* - 1}) - \epsilon)l \text{ whp, by Lemma 3}$$

$$= (p(t_*) - p(t_{* - 1}))l + 2\epsilon l \text{ whp, by Lemma 4.}$$

so that

$$p^* = \frac{\left| \{ j : \rho_j 2^{-\lceil r \rceil} < t^* 2^{-m} \} \right|}{|J_*| - |B| - |C|} > p(t^*) - 5\epsilon. \square$$

By a similar argument we can show:

Lemma 7. For every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and for any prover, with high probability, at the end of Step 4 either the verifier rejects or $p^* < p(t^*) + \epsilon$.

6. The Second Phase

In the second phase of the AM protocol, we try to obtain an estimate for $R(L'')$, where $L''$ is the language $L' \cap \Lambda(t^*)$, i.e.,

$$L''(y) = \begin{cases} L'(y) & \text{if } R(y) \leq t^* 2^{-m} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The language $L''$ is $\delta$-close to $L'$: The number of $y \in \{0, 1\}^m$ such that $R(y) > t^* 2^{-m}$ can be at most $t^* - 1 \delta 2^m \leq \delta 2^m$, since $R$ is a probability distribution. Therefore $|L'' \oplus L'| \leq |\{0, 1\}^m - \Lambda(t^*)| \leq \delta 2^m$.

Let $U$ denote the uniform distribution on $m$ bit strings. We assume that both the verifier and the prover know the probability $p_{adv} = Pr_{y \sim U}[y \in L']$. Let $\alpha = \delta/\omega$.

5 Verifier: Let $l = \omega/\alpha^3$. Generate strings $y_1, \ldots, y_l \in \{0, 1\}^m$ as follows: For every $1 \leq j \leq l$,

5.1 Toss a coin $t_j$, which is 1 with probability $\alpha$, 0 with probability $1 - \alpha$.

5.2 If $t_j = 1$, choose $y_j \sim R$. If $t_j = 0$, choose $y_j \sim U$.

Let $T = \{ j : t_j = 1 \}$. Send the sequence $y_1, \ldots, y_l$ to the prover.

6 Prover: For each $1 \leq j \leq l$, send a claim $a_j \in \{0, 1\}$ for the statement $y_j \in L'$. If $a_j = 1$, send an NP certificate for your claim. For each $j$, send a claim $b_j \in \{0, 1\}$ for the statement $R(y_j) \geq t^*$. Let $A^* = \{ j : a_j = 1 \}$, $B^* = \{ j : b_j = 1 \}$.

7 Verifier: For each $1 \leq j \leq l$, if $j \in B \cap T$, initiate the lower bound protocol for the claim $|G^{-1}(y_j)| \geq 2^{\lceil r \rceil} R(y_j)$. Perform the following tests:

7.1 If $|A^* \cap T|/|T| < p_{adv} - \alpha \epsilon$, reject.

7.2 If $|B^* \cap T|/|T| \not\in p^* \pm \epsilon$, reject.

7.3 If any of the lower bound protocol instantiations fail, reject.

If all tests pass, set $q^* = |A^* \cap B^* \cap T|/|T|$.

Let $A = \{ j : y_j \in L' \}$ and $B = \{ j : y_j \in \Lambda(t_*) \}$. By Lemma 3, with high probability $|T| > (1 - \alpha - \epsilon)l$ and $|T| > (\alpha - \epsilon)l \geq 2l/2$.

Lemma 8. For every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ there exists a “good” prover for which with high probability the verifier has not rejected by the end of Step 7 and $q^* < R(L'') + \epsilon$.

Proof. The good prover sends correct claims for all the queries; it gives answers $a_j = L(y_j)$ and $b_j = 1$ iff $R(y_j) \geq t^*$. We show this prover is likely to pass all tests, using Lemma 3 on several occasions.

Test 7.1: Follows directly from Lemma 3.
Test 7.2: With high probability, $|\overline{B} \cap T| \in (p(t^*) \pm \epsilon)|T|$. By Lemmas 6 and 7, $p(t^*) \in p^* \pm \epsilon$ with high probability, so that $|\overline{B} \cap T|/|T| \in p^* \pm \epsilon$.

Test 7.3: Follows from Lemma 1 (with high probability.)

It remains to show that $q^* < R(L'') + \epsilon$. First, $A^* \cap \overline{B} = A \cap \overline{B}_{i^*}$, so that $q^*$ is an unbiased estimator for the fraction of queries in $T$ that fall into $L \cap \Lambda(t^*) = L'$, when the queries are drawn from $R$. Since the number of samples in $T$ is at least $\alpha l/2 > \omega/e^3$, $q^* < R(L') + \epsilon$. \hfill \box

**Lemma 9.** For every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and for any prover, with high probability, the verifier either rejects by the end of Step 7 or $q^* > R(L'') - \epsilon$.

First, note that the verifier cannot make any false “yes” claims; if $a_j = 1$, it must be that $y_j \in L$, otherwise the prover will detect a faulty NP certificate for $y_j$. So the verifier can only cheat by making false “no” claims. Let $C = A - A^*$ denote the set of indices corresponding to these claims.

The main idea of the proof is to show that if $|C \cap \overline{B} \cap T|$ is a significant fraction of $|T|$, the verifier is likely to reject. Suppose the opposite is true, i.e., the prover cheats on many queries in $T$. We will show that the prover cannot distinguish, with significant confidence, whether a query in $\overline{B} \cap T$ came from $T$ or from $\overline{T}$; so if he cheats on many queries in $\overline{B} \cap T$, he will also end up cheating on a lot of queries in $\overline{B} \cap T \subseteq \overline{T}$. But in this case the prover will get caught in Step 1.

**Lemma 10.** For any choice of $C$ made by the prover in Step 5, if $|C \cap \overline{B}_{i^*}| > 6\alpha c$, then with high probability, $|C \cap T| > 2\alpha c$.

**Proof.** First we show that whenever $j \in \overline{B}_{i^*}$, the prover cannot tell if $t_j = 1$ based on its evidence with confidence over 1/2:

$$Pr[j \in T|y_1, \ldots, y_l] = Pr[j \in T|y_j] = \frac{Pr[y_j|j \in T]Pr[j \in T]}{Pr[y_j]} \leq \frac{Pr[y_j|j \in T]Pr[j \in T]}{Pr[y_j | j \notin T]Pr[j \notin T]} < \omega \delta^{-1} \frac{2^{-m} \cdot \alpha}{2} \frac{1}{1-\alpha} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Even when conditioned on seeing $y_1, \ldots, y_l$, the events “$j \in T$”, where $j \in C \cap \overline{B}_{i^*}$, are independent. By a crude estimate, with high probability, $|C \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| > 4\alpha c$, so that $|C \cap T| \geq |C \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| > 2\alpha c$. \hfill \box

**Lemma 11.** For every $x \in L$, and any prover, if the verifier survives Step 7, then $|\overline{B} \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| < \epsilon|T|$ with high probability.

**Proof.** Suppose the verifier survives Step 7. By Lemma 3, with high probability, $|\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| \in (p(t^*) \pm \epsilon)|T|$ and $|\overline{B}_{i^* - 1} \cap T| \in (p(t_{i^* - 1}) \pm \epsilon)|T|$. By Lemma 4, with high probability, $p(t^*) < p(t_{i^* - 1}) + \epsilon$. Putting this together, $|\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| < |\overline{B}_{i^* - 1} \cap T| + 3\epsilon|T|$.

First we show that $|\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| < 3\epsilon|T|$. By Lemma 1, with high probability, $\overline{B}_{i^* - 1} \cap T \subseteq \overline{B} \cap T$, for otherwise the verifier wouldn’t survive Step 7.3. It follows that

$$|\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| < 3\epsilon|T|.$$

Now we show that $|\overline{B} \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| < \epsilon|T|$. Since the verifier survives Step 7.2, by Lemma 6 with high probability:

$$|\overline{B} \cap T| \leq (p^* + \epsilon)|T| \leq (p(t^*) + \epsilon)|T|.$$

On the other hand,

$$|\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap \overline{B} \cap T| = |\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| - |\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap \overline{B} \cap T| > (p(t^*) - \epsilon)|T| - 3\epsilon|T| = (p(t^*) - \epsilon)|T|,$$

so that

$$|\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap \overline{B} \cap T| = |\overline{B} \cap T| - |\overline{B}_{i^*} \cap \overline{B} \cap T| < (p(t^*) + \epsilon)|T| - (p(t^*) + \epsilon)|T| < \epsilon|T|. \hfill \box$$

**Proof of Lemma 9.** If $|C \cap \overline{B}_{i^*}| > 6\alpha c$, then by Lemma 10 $|C \cap \overline{T}| > 2\alpha c|\overline{T}|$ with high probability. By Lemma 3, $|A \cap \overline{T}| < (p_{adv} + \alpha)|\overline{T}|$ with high probability. Next, $|A^* \cap T| = |A \cap T| - |C \cap T| < (p_{adv} - \alpha)|\overline{T}|$, and Step 7.1 rejects.

Suppose $|C \cap \overline{B}_{i^*}| \leq 6\alpha c$. Then

$$|A^* \cap \overline{B} \cap T| \geq |A^* \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| - |\overline{B} \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| \geq (|A \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| - |C \cap \overline{B}_{i^*}|) - |\overline{B} \cap \overline{B}_{i^*} \cap T| \geq (R(L \cap \Lambda(t^*)) - \epsilon)|T| - 6\alpha c - \epsilon|T| \geq (R(L') - \epsilon)|T|. \hfill \box$$

7. The Third Phase

The third phase is a variation of the Feigenbaum-Fortnow protocol for reductions with uniform marginal distributions.

8 Verifier: Let $l = \omega \log k / \epsilon^3$. Run $l$ independent instances of the reduction $R_{\text{in}}(x_i \cdot)$. Say the $i$th instance produces the circuit $A^i$ and queries $y_{i1}, \ldots, y_{ik} \in \{0, 1\}^m$. Send the queries $y_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq l, 1 \leq j \leq k$ to the prover.
9 Prover: For each pair $i, j$, send a claim $a_{ij}$ for the statement $y_{ij} \in L'$ (accompanied by an NP certificate, if $a_{ij} = 1$) and a claim $b_{ij}$ for the statement $R(y_{ij}) \geq t^*$. Let $A^*_j = \{ i : a_{ij} = 1 \}$, $B^*_j = \{ i : b_{ij} = 1 \}$.

10 Verifier: For each pair $i, j$, if $b_{ij} = 1$, initiate the lower bound protocol for the claim $\{|r : G(r) = y_{ij}\| \geq 2^{\sqrt{t^*}}\}$. Let $c_{ij} = a_{ij}(1 - b_{ij})$. Perform the following tests:

10.1 If for any $j$, $|B^*_j|/l \not\in p^* \pm \epsilon$, reject.

10.2 If for any $j$, $|A^*_j \cap B^*_j|/l < q^* - \epsilon$, reject.

10.3 If for any $i$, $A^i(y_{i1}, \ldots, y_{ik}; c_{i1}, \ldots, c_{ik})$ accepts, reject.

If all tests pass, accept.

Let $A_j = \{ i : y_{ij} \in L \}$, $B_j = \{ i : R(y_{ij}) < t^* \}$.

**Lemma 12.** For every $x \not\in L$, there exists a “good” prover that accepts with high probability by the end of Step 10.

**Proof.** The good prover claims $a_{ij} = L'(y_{ij})$ and $b_{ij} = 1$ iff $R(y_{ij}) \geq t^*$, for all pairs $i, j$. By Lemmas 6, 7 and 8, we may assume $p^* \in p(t^*) \pm \epsilon$ and $q^* < R(L') + \epsilon$ with high probability. It is not difficult to check that this prover passes all Step 10 tests with high probability. $\square$

**Lemma 13.** For every $x \in L$, and for any prover, with high probability, the verifier rejects by the end of Step 10.

**Proof.** Assume the verifier passes all instances of Test 10.1 and Test 10.2. We show that, with high probability, Test 10.3 must reject for some $i$. There are two types of queries for which the prover can fool the verifier about membership in $L'$: First, there are the queries that fall into $B_j \cap B_j$, for which $b_{ij}$ may be a lie. Then there are the queries in $|\{A_j - A_j^*\} \cap B_j|$ for which $b_{ij} = 0$ but $a_{ij}$ may be a lie. Let $C_j$ be the set of all possible lies:

$$C_j = (B_j \cap B_j) \cup ((A_j - A_j^*) \cap B_j).$$

As in the Feigebaum-Fortnow proof, the main idea is to show that for any fixed $j$, $|C_j|/l < 1/k$, so that there exists at least one $i \not\in C_1 \cup \ldots \cup C_k$. For this $i$, it will follow that $c_{ij} = L'(y_{ij})$ for all $j$, so that with high probability, $A(y_{i1}, \ldots, y_{ik}; c_{i1}, \ldots, c_{ik}) = L(x) = 1$ and Test 10.3 rejects.

We bound $|B_j \cap B_j|$ in the same fashion as in Lemma 11; by that argument, we have $|B_j \cap B_j| < cl < 1/2k$ with probability $1 - 1/\omega l$. For the other term,

$$|(A_j - A_j^*) \cap B_j|$$

$$= |A_j \cap B_j| - |A_j^* \cap B_j|$$

$$< (|A_j \cap B_j| + |B_j \cap B_j|) - |A_j^* \cap B_j|$$

$$< (R(L') + \epsilon)l + cl - (q^* - \epsilon)l$$

$$= (R(L') - q^*)l + cl$$

$$< cl \text{ whp, by Lemma 9.} \quad \square$$

8. **Average-case complexity for arbitrary samplable distributions**

Let $L$ be an NP-relation. We denote by $L_V$ the NP-language corresponding to $V$, i.e., $L_V(x) = 1$ iff there exists a $w$ such that $V(x, w) = 1$. A family of random functions $F_n : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a $\delta$-approximate witness oracle for $V$ with respect to distribution $D$ if for all $n$,

$$\Pr_{x \sim D, F}[V(x, F|x)(x) = L_V(x)] > 1 - \delta.$$

We will omit the subscript of $F$ when it is implicitly determined by the input length. Note that the definition implies the existence of a set $S$ of measure $D(S) = 1 - 3\delta$ and for all $x \in S$,

$$\Pr_{F}[V(x, F|x)(x) = L_V(x)] > 2/3.$$

Intuitively, $S$ is the set of inputs where the oracle has a good chance of producing a witness for the input. As usual, the constant $2/3$ is arbitrary, since if one has access to $F$, it can be queried $k$ times independently in parallel to obtain a good witness with probability $1 - 1/3k$.

Just as languages in NP represent decision problems, witness oracles represent search problems. For example, inverting a one-way function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ on a $1 - \delta$ fraction of inputs amounts to finding an algorithm $A : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ that is $\delta$-approximate for the relation $V(y, x) \iff y = f(x)$ with respect to the distribution $f(U)$.

Using witness oracles, we can formalize the notion of nonadaptive reductions between search problems, as well as reductions from search to decision problems, and vice-versa. Let $V, V'$ be NP relations and $D, D'$ be arbitrary polynomial-time samplable distributions. A $\delta$-to-$\delta'$ average-to-average reduction for search problems from $(V, D)$ to $(V', D')$ is a family of polynomial-size circuits $R = \{R_n\}$ such that: (1) On input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, randomness $r, R_n(x; r)$ outputs strings $y_1, \ldots, y_k$ and a “decoder” circuit $A$. (2) For any witness oracle $F^*$ that is $\delta'$-approximate for $V'$ with respect to $D'$, $V(x, A(y_1, \ldots, y_k; F^*(y_1), \ldots, F^*(y_k))) = L_V(x)$ with probability $1 - \delta$ over the choice of $x \sim D$ and $F^*$. The other two types of reductions are defined in similar fashion. A $\delta'$ worst-to-average reduction is a $0$-to-$\delta'$ average-to-average reduction.

**Theorem 2.** Let $L$ be a language that is NP-hard under polynomial-time reductions, $V'$ be an NP-relation, $D'$ be an arbitrary polynomial-time samplable distribution, and $\delta = n^{-O(1)}$. If there is a $\delta$ worst-to-average reduction from $L$ to $V'$, then there is an AM/poly protocol for $E$.  

7 Technically, a witness oracle is a distribution over function families $\{F_n\}$, but to simplify notation we will identify samples from this distribution with the distribution itself.
The theorem is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and the following two lemmas:

**Lemma 14.** For every NP-relation \( V \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \) (where \( m = n^{O(1)} \)), there exists an NP-language \( L' \) and a constant \( c \) such that there is a \( O(\delta m^2) \)-to-\( \delta \) average-to-average reduction from \((V, U)\) to \((L', U)\).

**Lemma 15.** For every NP-relation \( V \) and polynomial-time sampleable distribution \( D = D(U) \), where \( D : \{0, 1\}^{|\delta|} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, |\delta| = n^{O(1)} \), there exists an NP-relation \( V' \) such that there is a \( O(\delta |\delta|) \)-to-\( \delta \) average-to-average reduction from \((V, D)\) to \((V', U)\).

Analogues of these lemmas are known in the context of the distributional hardness of NP-problems. A variant of Lemma 14 appears in Ben-David et al. [4], while a variant of Lemma 15 was proved by Impagliazzo and Levin [16]. Our proofs are in essence a recasting of these arguments in the formalism of nonadaptive average-to-average reductions.

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**References**


